Leytham v. State Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 43551 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-30-2016
Leytham v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43551
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Leytham v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43551" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5836.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5836
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM,  ) 
     ) NO. 43551 
 Petitioner-Appellant, )       
) ADA COUNTY NO. CV 2015-2841 
v.     ) 
     )       
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Respondent.  ) 
___________________________) 
________________________ 
 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
________________________ 
 
HONORABLE CHERI C COPSEY 
District Judge  
________________________ 
 
SARA B. THOMAS     KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
State Appellate Public Defender  Deputy Attorney General 
State of Idaho     Criminal Law Division 
I.S.B. #5867      P.O. Box 83720 
       Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS    (208) 334-4534 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #6406 
P.O. Box 2816 
Boise, ID 83701  
(208) 334-2712 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR      ATTORNEY FOR 
PETITIONER-APPELLANT   RESPONDENT
 i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................1 
 Nature of the Case .....................................................................................1 
 
 Statement of the Facts and 
 Course of Proceedings ...............................................................................1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .....................................................................4 
ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................5 
 
I. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Leytham’s Request  
 To Conduct Depositions .............................................................................5 
 
II. The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Leytham’s  
 Petition For Post-Conviction Relief .............................................................8 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 14 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758 (1988) ........................................................................... 9 
Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Carroll, 148 Idaho 254 (2009) ...................................... 9 
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269 (Ct. App. 2002) ........................................................... 8 
Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371 (Ct. App. 1992) .............................................................. 5 
Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313 (Ct.App.1995) ............................................................... 9 
Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139 (Ct. App. 2006) ............................................................. 5 
Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918 (Ct. App. 1992) .............................................................. 9 
N.A. v. Carroll, 121 Idaho 148 (Ct. App. 1992) ................................................................ 9 
Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 254 (2009) ........................................................................... 8 
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247 (2009) ......................................................................... 8 
State v. Leytham, 2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 360 (Ct. App. 2016) .......................... 1 
State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548 (2008) ............................................................................. 8 
State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437 (2008) ..................................................................... 8, 9 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ............................................................... 9 
Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552 (2009) ............................................................ 9 
 
Statutes 
 
I.C. § 19–4903 ................................................................................................................. 8 
I.C. § 19–4906 ................................................................................................................. 8 
 
 iii 
Rules 
 
I.C.R. 57(b) ...................................................................................................................... 5 
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1) ................................................................................................................ 8 
I.R.C.P. 56 ....................................................................................................................... 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Jimmy D. Leytham appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing 
his petition for post-conviction relief.  He asserts that the district court erred by denying 
his request for depositions and by summarily dismissing one of the claims in his petition. 
   
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 In docket number 43225, Mr. Leytham pleaded guilty to one count of forgery and 
the district court imposed a sentence of ten years, with five years determinate.  
(R., docket no. 43225 & 43226, p.77.)1  In docket number 43226, Mr. Leytham pleaded 
guilty to criminal possession of a financial transaction card and the district court 
imposed a sentence of five years indeterminate to be served consecutively to the 
sentence in docket number 43225.  (R., docket no. 43225 & 43226, p.352.)  
Mr. Leytham did not appeal from his judgments of conviction.  He did, however, 
subsequently file Rule 35 motions for reduction of sentence in both cases.  (R., docket 
no. 43225 & 43226, pp.85, 360.)  The denial of those motions was affirmed on appeal.  
See State v. Leytham, 2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 360 (Ct. App. 2016).   
On February 25, 2015, Mr. Leytham filed a petition for post-conviction relief from 
the forgery charge.  (R., p.4.)  He asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
conduct a proper pre-trial investigation, failing to discuss trial strategy, and failing to 
communicate with him.  (R., pp.5-6.)   
                                            
1 A motion requesting that the Court take judicial notice of the transcripts, record, and 
PSI in State v. Leytham is being filed contemporaneously with this Appellant’s Brief.   
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Mr. Leytham elaborated on his claims in an affidavit.  (R., p.15.)  He asserted that 
he placed more than 20 calls to his attorney but they were never returned.  (R., pp.15-
16.)  He stated that he asked his attorney for a binding Rule 11 agreement but was told 
that the judge would not allow it.  (R., p.16.)  Mr. Leytham averred that he asked his 
counsel to recuse the district court judge, but he refused.  (R., p.16.)  Counsel told him 
that he and the judge were good friends.  (R., p.16.)   
Mr. Leytham then asserted that counsel did not contact him before a court 
appearance, and that counsel’s law partner, who did not know about his case, appeared 
at that hearing.  (R., p.16.)  When Mr. Leytham finally did speak to his attorney, he was 
told that counsel had worked out a “great deal” and that if he pleaded guilty he would 
get probation.  (R., p.17.)  At the entry of plea hearing, Mr. Leytham was told to say that 
there were no promises.  (R., p.17.)  At sentencing, Mr. Leytham received a sentence of 
ten years, with five years fixed.  (R., p.17.)   
Mr. Leytham filed a motion requesting the ability to depose his trial counsel 
regarding his claims, which the district court denied, stating that it believed that 
Mr. Leytham was engaging in a “fishing expedition.”  (R., pp.44, 55.) 
With the assistance of counsel, Mr. Leytham filed a second affidavit.  (R., p.59.)  
In this affidavit, Mr. Leytham asserted that he had hired Brian Neville as his attorney, 
but on the day he pleaded guilty, Brian Blender, who worked with Mr. Neville, appeared 
to represent him.  (R., p.59.)  Mr. Leytham did not know that Mr. Blender would be 
appearing that day and only had a 7-10 minute discussion with him prior to pleading 
guilty.  (R., p.59.)  Mr. Blender and Mr. Leytham did not discuss restitution that day.  
(R., p.60.) 
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Mr. Leytham was taking numerous medications at the time of his plea; these 
medications impacted his ability to understand the proceedings and he initially informed 
the court that the medications made him more susceptible to suggestions from 
Mr. Blender.  (R., p.60.)  Mr. Leytham did not fill out the entire written guilty plea himself.  
(R., p.60.) 
Mr. Leytham asserted that he told Mr. Neville about his medical conditions, but 
Mr. Neville did not obtain any medical records for purposes of sentencing.  (R., p.60.)  
Further, Mr. Leytham believed that restitution was $202.75 because that was the 
amount in the PSI; at the sentencing hearing, counsel agreed to $55,331.92 without 
asking Mr. Leytham if he agreed to that amount.  (R., p.60.)   
Mr. Leytham then asserted that counsel did not show him the PSI and an 
evaluation by Dr. Arnold until the day of sentencing and he was unable to read those 
documents himself because of a medical condition.  (R., p.60.)  His attorney only read 
the recommendations of the PSI to him and advised him not to say anything when he 
had the opportunity to address the court at sentencing.  (R., p.60.)  Finally, Mr. Leytham 
asserted that his attorneys never spoke to him about the right to appeal his sentence 
and no appeal was filed.  (R., p.60.)   
The State filed a motion for summary dismissal, which the district court granted.  
(R., pp.86, 99.)  Mr. Leytham appealed.  (R., p.130.)  He asserts that the district court 
erred by denying his motion to conduct depositions and by summarily dismissing his 
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately advise him prior to entry of 
his plea.   
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err by denying Mr. Leytham’s motion to conduct 
depositions? 
 
2. Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Leytham’s petition for post-
conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
 I. 
 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Leytham’s Request To Conduct Depositions 
 
The decision to authorize discovery in a post-conviction case “is a matter 
directed to the discretion of the trial court.” Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148 
(Ct. App. 2006); see also I.C.R. 57(b) (“The provisions for discovery in the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure shall not apply to [post-conviction] proceedings unless and only to the 
extent ordered by the trial court.”). A trial court is not required to order discovery in a 
post-conviction action unless it is necessary to protect the petitioner's substantial rights. 
Murphy, 143 Idaho at 148; Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 375 (Ct. App. 1992).  A court 
is not required to permit a petitioner to engage in “fishing expedition” discovery because 
a post-conviction action “provides a forum for known grievances, not an opportunity to 
research for grievances.”  Murphy, 143 Idaho at 148. 
Mr. Leytham’s motion specifically lists the three claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel: the failure to conduct an adequate pre-trial investigation, the failure to 
discuss strategy prior to the entry of the plea and the failure to effectively communicate.  
(R., p.47.)  Post-conviction counsel asserted that “Mr. Leytham’s claims require further 
investigation in order to determine what factual basis exists for them.  Mr. Leytham’s 
present counsel needs to ask questions related to his claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in order to provide the required evidence to earn an evidentiary hearing . . .”  
(R., p.46.)  Post-conviction counsel also asserted, “a deposition is the only pre-
evidentiary hearing mechanism for fully and fairly developing Petitioner’s claims.  Unlike 
affidavits or other discovery methods, depositions provide both parties a full opportunity 
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to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct.”  (R., p.44.)  The 
district court denied the motion, holding that Mr. Leytham was going on a fishing 
expedition and had made no showing that depositions were necessary.   
Because Mr. Leytham made factual assertions in his affidavit and requested only 
to depose trial counsel regarding his specific claims, he asserts that his motion was not 
a generalized search for grievances but a request to question trial counsel regarding his 
already alleged grievances.  Further, his post-conviction attorney asserted that he 
needed to ask questions of trial counsel to develop the claims and that affidavits were 
insufficient to fully reconstruct the circumstances of trial counsel’s challenged conduct.  
The motion requested that trial counsel be deposed concerning the three allegations in 
the petition, it was not a general fishing expedition.  Further, Mr. Leytham elaborated on 
his claims in an affidavit.  (R., p.15.)  He asserted that he placed more than 20 calls to 
his attorney but they were never returned.  (R., pp.15-16.)  He stated that he asked his 
attorney for a binding Rule 11 agreement but was told that the judge would not allow it.  
(R., p.16.)  Mr. Leytham averred that he asked his counsel to recuse the district court 
judge, but he refused.  (R., p.16.)  Counsel told him that he and the judge were good 
friends.  (R., p.16.)   
Mr. Leytham then asserted that counsel did not contact him before a court 
appearance, and that counsel’s law partner, who did not know about his case, appeared 
at that hearing.  (R., p.16.)  When Mr. Leytham finally did speak to his attorney, he was 
told that counsel had worked out a “great deal” and that if he pleaded guilty he would 
get probation.  (R., p.17.)  At the entry of plea hearing, Mr. Leytham was told to say that 
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there were no promises.  (R., p.17.)  At sentencing, Mr. Leytham received a sentence of 
ten years, with five years fixed.  (R., p.17.)  
Because Mr. Leytham made factual assertions in his affidavit and requested only 
to depose trial counsel regarding his specific claims, he asserts that his motion was not 
a generalized search for grievances but a request to question trial counsel regarding his 
already alleged grievances.  Further, his post-conviction attorney asserted that he 
needed to ask questions of trial counsel to develop the claims.  Post-conviction counsel 
also asserted, in the response to the State’s motion for summary disposition, that 
several of Mr. Leytham’s claims “involve communications or lack therefore with his 
counsel in the underlying criminal case, and many of those claims are not addressed 
the record.”  (R., p.88.)  Counsel noted that he requested the ability to depose trial 
counsel to address the issues which were not in the record, and that this motion was 
denied.  (R., p.88.)  Further, post-conviction counsel asserted that, while the State 
claimed that Mr. Leytham’s allegations were not consistent with his answers in the guilty 
plea form or at the entry of plea hearing, “Mr. Leytham as indicated that he did not fill 
out the Guilty Plea Advisory Form entirely on his own and that he was being advised to 
answer the Court’s questions a certain way by his counsel during his guilty plea.”  (R., 
p.93.)  Counsel acknowledged that these conversations were not in the record, but that 
“Mr. Leytham has attempted to conduct discovery during his post-conviction case to 
clarify these issues of fact; however, this Court has denied his request.”  (R., p.93.)  
Counsel argued that a deposition of trial counsel with regard to his social relationship 
with the judge would also have been helpful.  (R., p.93.)  Mr. Leytham’s motion was not 
a fishing expedition but rather an attempt to provide evidentiary support for his claims.  
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Post-conviction counsel represented to the district court that he “needed” depositions to 
get further evidence of the claims and believed affidavits would be insufficient, and 
pointed to several instances where the lack of discovery impacted his ability to respond 
to the State’s motion for summary dismissal.   Mr. Leytham respectfully asserts that the 
district court erred by denying his motion to conduct depositions. 
   
 II. 
 
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Leytham’s Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief 
 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post–Conviction 
Procedure Act, I.C. § 19–4901 et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief is a civil 
proceeding, governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  Pizzuto v. State, 146 
Idaho 720, 724 (2008).  However, “[t]he ‘application must contain much more than a 
short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 
8(a)(1).’”  State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560 (2008) (quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 
Idaho 269, 271 (Ct. App. 2002)). The application must be supported by a statement that 
“specifically set[s] forth the grounds upon which the application is based.”  Rhoades v. 
State, 148 Idaho 247, 249–51 (2009). “The application must present or be accompanied 
by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to 
dismissal.”  Payne, 146 Idaho at 561 (citing I.C. § 19–4903). 
“Idaho Code § 19–4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the trial court's own 
initiative. Summary dismissal of an application is the procedural equivalent of summary 
judgment under I.R.C.P. 56.”  State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008).  “When 
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reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies the same 
standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion.” Citibank (South Dakota), 
N.A. v. Carroll, 148 Idaho 254, 257, 220 P.3d 1073, 1076 (2009) (citing Van v. Portneuf 
Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 556 (2009)).  Likewise, when reviewing a district court's order 
of summary dismissal in a post-conviction relief proceeding, we apply the same 
standard as that applied by the district court.  Thus, when reviewing such a dismissal, 
“the Court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the 
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file.”  Yakovac, 
145 Idaho at 444. 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the 
post-conviction procedure act.  Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924–25 (Ct. App. 1992). 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that 
the attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the 
deficiency.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064–65, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693–94 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316 (Ct.App.1995). To 
establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of showing that the attorney's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  Aragon v. State, 
114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988).  
Based on his pleadings and affidavits, the district court concluded that 
Mr. Leytham’s claims fell into four categories: 
1.  Trial counsel failed to investigate his medical issues; 
2. Trial counsel failed to advise him on all matters necessary to enter an 
informed guilty plea;  
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3. Trial counsel and Mr. Leytham’s relationship broke down; and  
4. Trial counsel failed to inform Mr. Leytham of his rights and responsibilities 
under the plea deal prior to entry and misled him as to what the court 
would do. 
(R., p.109).  Mr. Leytham asserts that he raised a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether counsel adequately advised him with regard to the entry of his guilty plea, 
specifically regarding his sentence.   
At the entry of plea hearing, when asked if he had any reason to believe that 
Mr. Leytham was under the influence of alcohol or medication, trial counsel responded 
that Mr. Leytham was on medication and appeared only “mostly rational.”  (9/10/14 
Tr., p.12, Ls.2-9.)  Counsel believed that Mr Leytham understood what was “going on,” 
but then said that “there were just some questions in what he had kind of told me about 
his history and things like this.”  (9/10/14 Tr., p.12, Ls.18-22.)  Counsel then stated that 
his assessment was based on the medications that Mr. Leytham had been taking, and 
Mr. Leytham “wasn’t sure how they affected him.”  (9/10/14 Tr., p.13, Ls.6-17.)   
The court then asked Mr. Leytham what medication he was taking.  He stated 
that he had been taking depression pills three times a day for the past forty-five days 
but did not know what they were.  He also took “Norco” three times a day for pain as 
well as Lyrica and Cymbalta for nerve damage and high cholesterol.  (9/10/14 Tr., p.14, 
L.3 – p.15, L.4.)  When asked who filled out the guilty plea form, counsel admitted, “he 
[Mr. Leytham] filled out part of it and I filled some of it out.”  (9/10/14 Tr., p.16, Ls.6-7.)  
Counsel did not remember what part he filled out.  (9/10/14 Tr., p.16, Ls.12-14.)   
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The court then questioned Mr. Leytham.  While Mr. Leytham told the court that 
the medication he was taking did not affect his understanding, Mr. Leytham then said 
that the medication made him “more susceptible to Mr. Blender’s suggestions.”  
(9/10/14 Tr., p.22, Ls.12-24.)  Mr. Leytham then said that he misunderstood the 
question.  (9/10/14 Tr., p.23, Ls.3-6.)  With regard to the issue of who filled out the guilty 
plea questionnaire, Mr. Leytham stated that Mr. Blender circled about three squares but 
did not state which ones.  (9/10/14 Tr., p.21, Ls.1-6.)  The court then conducted a plea 
colloquoy and Mr. Leytham stated that he understood the terms of the plea agreement 
and was voluntarily pleading guilty.  (9/10/14 Tr., p.25, L.1 – p.34, L.6.)   
 With regard to the claim that he was misled as to his sentence, the court 
determined that the entry of plea transcript indicated that the court advised Mr. Leytham 
of the possible punishments and that it was not required to accept counsel’s 
recommendations.  (R., p.117.)  The court then held that even assuming that Mr. 
Leytham was misled, he could not show prejudice because the record clearly showed 
that Mr. Leythan understood that the court was free to impose the sentence that it did .  
(R., p.117.)   
Mr. Leytham does not dispute that this exchange occurred at the entry of plea 
hearing.  However, this must be considered in relation to the claims that Mr. Leytham 
made in his affidavits.  In his first affidavit, Mr. Leytham acknowledged that there was 
discussion about whether any promises had been made, and that he specifically asked 
his attorney about the “probation he had promised,” and counsel told him “this is not 
what the Court is asking about.”  (R., p.17.)  Thus, Mr. Leytham submitted evidence that 
he was informed by counsel not to tell the court about any potential promises.  Thus, 
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Mr. Leytham’s first affidavit explains why he answered the way he did at the entry of 
plea hearing, and it was because of counsel’s advice.  Mr. Leytham’s petition and 
affidavit do not dispute that the court questioned him about promises being made.  His 
affidavit is admissible evidence of why he responded to the court in the way he did, 
which is because counsel told him to say there were no promises because probation 
was not what the court was asking about.  Mr. Leytham asserts that he did raise a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether he truly understood the sentence imposed because 
his affidavit demonstrates that he had concerns when the court discussed the possible 
sentence and counsel advised him that this was not actually what the court was talking 
about.   
 Thus, in this circumstance, Mr. Leytham asserts that this claim is not disproven 
by the record.  Mr. Leytham never asserted that there was no discussion about 
sentencing promises at the entry of plea hearing; he acknowledged that this discussion 
occurred but offered evidence in the form of the affidavit as to why he responded the 
way he did, and he asserted that counsel was ineffective for advising him to answer the 
court in the way that he did.  Further, the initial affidavit clearly asserts that Mr. Leytham 
did not want to enter a guilty plea but only did after counsel explained that he would get 
a “great deal” because he would get probation.  (R., pp.16-17.)  Thus, Mr. Leytham 
submits that the factual allegations in his affidavit create a genuine issue of material fact 
as to both deficient performance and prejudice with this claim.   
 Further, this claim must be considered in relation to the claim, that is supported 
by the entry of plea transcript, that Mr. Leytham was taking medication that impacted his 
ability to understand the proceedings.  While the district court is correct that 
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Mr. Leytham, after lengthy questioning, informed the court that he understood the plea 
agreement, the record shows that at the time the guilty plea was entered, counsel had 
questions about the effects of Mr. Leytham’s medication on his ability to understand, 
that counsel actually filled out part of the guilty plea form, and that Mr. Leytham initially 
said that the medication made him susceptible to counsel’s suggestions.  The district 
court noted, in a discussion of whether Mr. Leytham’s plea was voluntary,2 that the 
evidence at the entry of plea hearing demonstrating that Mr. Leytham understood the 
consequences of his plea.  (R., p.125.)  Again, Mr. Leytham does not dispute that he 
eventually told the court that he understood the plea consequences.  However, this 
must be balanced against the allegations in his affidavits, where Mr. Leytham clearly 
asserts that he was taking pain medication that affected his ability to understand the 
proceedings.  And the entry of plea hearing contains statements that support this claim.  
Mr. Leytham was taking Hydrocodone, his counsel indicated that he had some concerns 
about this medication, counsel filled out part of the guilty plea questionnaire, and 
Mr. Leytham initially stated that his medication made his susceptible to suggestion.  
Mr. Leytham submits that the record indicates that there is at least a genuine issue of 
fact as to what Mr. Leytham understood at the entry of plea hearing, based on what his 
counsel told him and the medication he was on. 
 Mr. Leytham submits that his affidavit creates a genuine issue of material fact 
with regard to the claim that counsel told him that if he pled guilty he would get 
                                            
2 Mr. Leytham acknowledges that his petition does not raise a claim that his plea was 
involuntary; rather issues concerning the entry of plea were raised in the context of a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately advise him of the 
consequences of the plea. 
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probation.  While Mr. Leytham did acknowledge the court was not bound by sentencing 
recommendations or any promises, Mr. Leytham explained in his affidavit why he 
responded to the court in the manner he did. In this circumstance, where Mr. Leytham 
explained in his affidavit why he answered the court the way he did, he asserts that the 
district court erred in granting summary judgment on this claim. 
   
 CONCLUSION 
Mr. Leytham requests that the district court’s order granting summary dismissal 
be reversed and his case remanded for further proceedings.   
 DATED this 30th day of March, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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